This paper proposes that an important consequence of …nancial innovation is to induce endogenous changes in the number and composition of market participants. Under plausible assumptions, these participation changes induce an increase in the relative price of preexisting assets, and this e¤ect is stronger for assets in the direction of innovation. We introduce the concept of GEI equilibrium with endogenous participation (GEEP). Competitive investors can freely operate in the credit market but must pay a …xed entry cost to invest in risky assets. Asset prices and the participation structure are jointly determined in equilibrium. We show existence and constrained optimality of equilibrium under general conditions, and then specialize to a CARA-normal framework with …nitely many risk factors. When new entrants have low risk exposure to the risk spanned by an existing asset, the mean endowment of market participants becomes less correlated with the asset, leading to a decrease in its risk premium and an increase in its relative price. These theoretical results are shown to be consistent with the empirical literature on …nancial innovation.
Introduction
This paper proposes that an important consequence of …nancial innovation is to induce endogenous changes in the number and composition of market participants, which lead, under plausible assumptions, to an increase in the relative price of preexisting assets. This result has a remarkably simple intuition in a mean variance setting. When new entrants have low risk exposure to the risk spanned by an existing asset, the mean endowment of market participants becomes less correlated with the asset, leading to a decrease in its risk premium and an increase in its relative price.
Our approach builds on two stylized facts. First, participation in …nancial markets is costly. Corporate hedging requires the employment of experts able to e¤ectively reduce the …rm's risk exposure using existing …nancial assets. Investors have to sustain learning costs and costs related to the opening and maintenance of accounts with an exchange or a brokerage …rm. Statutory and government regulations often create barriers to participation of institutional investors to some …nancial assets. Second, in an economy with incomplete markets, …nancial innovation a¤ects the available risk sharing and investment opportunities. The introduction of options and futures allows insurance against the price risk of the underlying assets and commodities. Similarly, mortgages, credit card receivables, airplane and car leasing contracts are sold to investors in the form of asset-backed securities and allow lending institutions to greatly reduce their risk exposure.
We consider a two period …nance economy with incomplete markets and endogenous participation. Agents can freely operate in the credit market but have to pay a …xed entry cost in order to invest in one or more risky assets. Financial innovation a¤ects asset prices through increased spanning and the modi…ed composition of market participants. We specify our model to a CARA-normal framework with a factor structure for the agents' risk exposure. The e¤ect of …nancial innovation on asset prices depends on the cross-sectional distribution of risk across agents. We …nd that the introduction of new securities tends to increase the relative prices of existing assets when the majority of agents are endowed with low risk exposure. Consistent with the empirical literature on the introduction of new options 1 , we show that the increase in relative price is strongest for assets which are most closely correlated to the new asset. 1 See Conrad (1989) , Detemple and Jorion (1990) , Stucki and Wasserfallen (1994) . Jochum and Kodres (1998) review the empirical literature on the e¤ects of the introduction of derivatives on the price of the underlying asset.
Section 2 introduces and analyzes the concept of GEI equilibrium with endogenous participation (GEEP) in an arbitrary two period setting. We then specialize to the CARA-normal framework. Section 3 analyzes the entry decision of an investor and derives the equilibrium conditions. Sections 4 introduces a factor model for agents' risk exposure. Section 5 and 6 examine the e¤ect of …nancial innovation under various factor structures.
Review of Previous Literature
Restricted participation models, with a …xed …nancial structure, have been used to explain the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) . Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Vissing-Jørgensen (1998) study empirical issues whereas Basak and Cuoco (1998) provide a theoretical framework. Endogenous participation has also been used in the asset pricing literature to analyze other issues: volatility of asset prices (Pagano, 1989; Orosel, 1998) , market liquidity (Williamson, 1993) , futures risk premia (Hirshleifer, 1989) . Another strand of the asset pricing literature, pioneered by Allen and Gale (1988) , focus on the e¤ect of …nancial innovation on asset prices, without consideration to participation issues. Detemple and Selden (1991) show, in a general one period economy, that there are interactions between the option and the stock market. They also show that, under some preference and informational assumptions, the introduction of a call option increases the underlying stock price. Huang and Wang (1997) …nd, in a dynamic model, that the introduction of a collar contract increases the volatility and the price of the underlying stock. Calvet (1997) studies how the evolution of the economy …nancial structure can determine ‡uctuations in asset prices. To the best of our knowledge, …nancial innovation and market participation have been analyzed mainly as separate issues in the literature. We have found two notable exceptions. Allen and Gale (1990) consider a model with endogenous participation to an option exchange. They show that the market structure of the economy need not be e¢cient when the decision to set-up an option exchange is taken by a monopolist before charging entry fees from investors willing to participate in the new market. Pagano (1993) endogenizes …nancial innovation in the form new stock issues. In his model investors and …rms face entry costs to participate in the stock market. He argues that the existence of multiple equilibria might explain why di¤erent stock market sizes are observed across countries and time.
GEI Equilibrium with Endogenous Participation
We examine an exchange economy with two periods (t = 0; 1) and a single perishable good. The economy is stochastic, and all random variables are de…ned on a probability space (-; F; P). There exists a set H of agents who consume the good in every date t = 0; 1. ; e c h ). In this paper, we place no restriction on the size of the set H containing all agents. In particular, the set H can be …nite or in…nite. To provide a uniform treatment, we endow the space H with a measure ¹ that satis…es ¹ (H) = 1: This is equivalent to viewing each element of H as a type, and to view ¹ as a probability measure on all possible types.
At date t = 0, agents can exchange two types of real securities. First, there exists a riskless asset costing ¼ 0 in date t = 0 and delivering one unit of the good with certainty at date t = 1. Second, there also exist J risky assets (j = 1; :::J ) with price ¼ j and random payo¤ã j : We assume for simplicity that all assets are in zero net supply. 2 Investors can freely operate in the bond market but have to pay a …xed entry cost in order to invest in one or more risky assets. Investors are pricetakers both in their entry and portfolio decisions, and there are no constraints on short sales. Denote by ¼ the vector of risky asset prices, by µ h the vector of risky assets bought (or sold) by investor h, and by 1 fµ h 6 =0g the indicator function equal to 1 if µ h 6 = 0 and 0 otherwise. With this notation, the budget set of agent h is de…ned by
We note that this budget set can be viewed as the union of two closed sets. Given a participation decision, an agent can calculate the optimal consumptionportfolio choice and therefore an indirect utility level. The agent then chooses the participation decision with the highest indirect utility. The equilibrium concept is de…ned as follows.
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This framework is particularly pertinent for securities such as futures and options. Extensions of this model would consider the endogenous supply of securities by …rms.
De…nition 1. We say that
] is a General Equilibrium with Endogenous Participation (GEEP) if
1.
R
2.
R H µ h j d¹(h) = 0 for all j = 0; :::; J:
In the absence of entry costs ( = 0); the concepts of GEEP and GEI coincide. GEEP is thus a generalization of the traditional GEI. With positive entry costs, a GEEP equilibrium di¤ers from the traditional concept through two di¤erent channels. First, agents have di¤erent budget sets and endogenously make their participation decisions. Second, trading activities use some of society's resources and thus crowds out private consumption, as seen in the market clearing condition at date t = 0. This phenomenon, which we call the displacement e¤ect, probably plays a minor role in actual economies. Extensions of our model could transfer a fraction of trading fees to certain consumers (such as exchange owners), or seek to provide a more detailed description of the …nancial industry. We now examine the welfare properties of equilibrium with endogenous participation. As already seen in the GEI subcase, equilibrium allocations are usually Pareto ine¢cient because the absence of certain markets induces incomplete risksharing. With two periods and a single good, however, GEI allocations are known to satisfy a limited or constrained form of e¢ciency: no social planner can improve the utility of all agents when income transfers are constrained to belong to the asset span. This limited form of e¢ciency easily generalizes to our setting.
is called feasible if and only if
We can now introduce
is called constrained Pareto-e¢cient if it is feasible and if no other feasible allocation (d
By standard arguments, it is now straightforward to show
] is a GEEP, the allocation
is constrained Pareto-e¢cient.
Proof. Assume that there exists a feasible allocation (d
We know that for all h; there exists (´h 0 ;´h)
We aggregate across consumers:
The theorem implies that as in the GEI case, the introduction of a new asset cannot make all agents worse o¤.
Existence of Equilibrium
In a standard GEI economy, we know that an equilibrium always exists when there are two periods and a single good (Cass, 1984 ; Werner, 1985; Hens, 1991) . 3 We now establish the existence of our GEEP equilibrium when the state space -= f1; ::; Sg is …nite and the economy satis…es standard hypotheses. Despite this simplifying hypothesis on individual preferences, the existence proof is slightly more complicated in our model than in the GEI case. This is because at 3 There is an extensive literature on the existence of equilibrium in GEI economies with one good and two periods (Du¢e and Shafer, 1985; Husseini, Lasry and Magill, 1990; Geanakoplos and Shafer, 1990; Hirsch, Magill and Mas-Colell, 1990). With more than one good or more than one period, the existence of equilibrium can only be obtained as a generic property (Hart, 1975; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1986 ).
prices where agents are indi¤erent between entry (µ h 6 = 0) and no-entry (µ h = 0); individual demand for consumption and assets is a non-convex correspondence. In order to prove existence, we make the following hypothesis.
Assumption 2.
There exists a …nite number of individual types h = 1; ::; H, and a continuum of agents of each type.
We can then show Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a GEEP equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix ¥
Given standard technical conditions, the proof of existence directly extends to any economy in which the measure ¹ of agents over types is atomless.
The CARA-Normal Economy with Endogenous Participation
In order to analyze the e¤ect of …nancial innovation on investor participation and asset prices, we consider the tractable class of CARA-normal economies.
In this section, we solve the participation and consumption-portfolio decision of an individual investor, and then derive the equations that jointly determine the participation structure and the prices of …nancial assets. We consider a standard CARA-normal setup. Individual endowments and the payo¤s of risky assets are jointly normal, and each investor h has separable utility
The assets f1;ã 1 ; ::;ã J g generate a linear subspace in the set L 2 (-) of squareintegrable random variables. Without loss of generality, we assume that the assets are orthonormal, implyingã = (ã 1 ; ::;ã J ) s N (0; I). We denote by A the span of risky assets fã 1 ; :::;ã J g ; and by A 0 the span of all traded assets f1;ã 1 ; ::;ã J g: Given a linear subspace V , it is convenient to represent byx V the projection on V of a random variablex , and by V ? the subspace orthogonal to V .
Individual Entry Decision
This section analyzes the participation and consumption-portfolio decision of an individual investor h. We …rst calculate the consumption-portfolio choice under entry and no-entry in the risky asset market. Comparing the resulting utility levels yields the optimal entry decision.
When trading in risky assets, investor h maximizes
It is convenient to consider the tradable portfoliom A´¡ (R=°) P J j=1 ¼ jãj ; that is determined by asset prices and the individual coe¢cient of risk aversion.
Theorem 3. When participating in the risky asset market, the investor buys
units of risky asset j, and
units of the riskless asset. The corresponding consumption levels are then
and e c h;
Proof. See Appendix ¥
The investor thus exchanges the marketable componentẽ hA of her income risk for the tradable portfoliom A , which allows an optimal allocation of risk and return. We now examine the decision problem of an investor h trading only the riskless asset. The agent bears all her endowment risk in period 1, and the random consumption satis…esc
By a direct application of Theorem 3, the optimal decision is given by Corollary 1. When not entering the risky asset market, the investor chooses
units of the riskless asset. The corresponding consumption and utility levels are then
The investor participates in the risky asset market if U p > U n ; or equivalently c and is indi¤erent to entry when this relation holds as an equality.
Proof. By Theorem 3 and Corollary 1, the condition c
which simpli…es to°V ar Figure 3 .1. The agent trades risky assets if the distance between her income riskẽ hA and her optimal portfoliom A is larger than p 2 R=°: Participation is negatively a¤ected by a high interest rate because the entry cost is completely sustained in the …rst period, while the bene…ts from participation pertain to both periods.
Equilibrium
Let P µ H denote the subset of agents who participate in the risky asset market. Theorem 4 implies that where
ª denotes the set of agents who strictly prefer participation, while
tains the agents who are indi¤erent to entry. Market participants typically have di¤erent income risk characteristics than the entire population. We will show in Sections 5 and 6 that this di¤erence is a driving element of the model. the average income of the entire population. By contrast, we de…ne the average endowment among participantsẽ
where ¹ p is the conditional measure ¹=¹ (P) when ¹ (P) > 0; and is equal to zero otherwise.
We obtain the price of risky assets by averaging (3:2) across participating agents: Theorem 5. In equilibrium, the risky assets are worth
and the interest rate satis…es
where
Proof. See Appendix ¥ These pricing formulae hold whether the participation structure is exogenous or endogenous. For this reason, they coincide with the results obtained by Willen (1998) for GEI economies with exogenous participation. When the participation set P is exogenous, it is straightforward to analyze the e¤ect of participation on asset prices. An exogenous increase in P a¤ects the riskless rate through two di¤erent channels, which correspond to the last two terms of equation (3.10) . First, a higher participation implies that more …rst period resources ¹ (P) are absorbed in the entry process, leading to an increase the interest rate. Second, the interest rate is a¤ected by the dispersion of income risk among participants. This e¤ect can be interpreted by observing that Z
When their tradable income risks are very dispersed, market participants use …nancial assets to sharply reduce the average variance of their second period consumption. This weakens their precautionary motive, reduces their marginal rates of substitution, and increases the equilibrium interest rate.
In our model of endogenous participation, asset prices and the set P are jointly determined. When the entry cost is in…nite, no agent trades in the risky asset (P = ?) and the equilibrium interest rate equals R 0 : Conversely, consider an equilibrium in which no agent participates. The mean endowment of participants is zero (ẽ p = 0) and individual rationality imposes°V ar ¡ẽ hA ¢ =2 6 R 0 : Let
We can show Proposition 1. When ¸ max ; the economy has a unique GEEP equilibrium, in which no agent trades in risky assets: ¹ (P) = 0. On the other hand if < max ; any GEEP equilibrium has a non-negligible set of participants.
Proof. Assuming ¸ max ; consider a GEEP equilibrium in which ¹ (P) > 0: Equation (3.10) imposes that the equilibrium interest rate R is strictly greater than R 0 : We infer that°V ar ¡ẽ hA ¢ =2 6 max R 0 < R; for all h and thus P = ;. Conversely, consider a GEEP equilibrium in an economy in which < max and P = ;: We know that there exists a (non-negligible) set S of agents such that (°=2R 0 )V ar ¡ẽ hA ¢ > : Therefore ¹(P)¸¹(S) > 0, which is a contradiction. ¥
E¤ects of Financial Innovation
We can analyze the e¤ect of …nancial innovation on asset prices from Theorem 5. When participation is exogenous, an increase in the asset span has no e¤ect on the relative price ¼ j =¼ 0 = ¡°Cov(ẽ p ;ã j ) of preexisting assets. This result is consistent with the …ndings of Oh (1996) on CAPM economies. We also see that …nancial innovation also tends to increase the interest rate R; as in Elul (1997) . This result has a simple intuition. A larger asset span allows greater risk sharing, leading to reduction in the precautionary motive and thus in the demand for the riskless asset. The interest rate is therefore higher in equilibrium.
In our GEEP model, participation is endogenous. Financial innovation can potentially change the market endowmentẽ p ; and therefore the relative price ¼ j =¼ 0 of risky assets. The absolute price of an asset also depends on the interest rate. The variation of the interest rate is in general di¢cult to predict and depends on the possible change inẽ p : In the following proposition, we show that the movement of the interest rate can be predicted whenẽ p remains constant as new assets are added to the economy. Proposition 2. Letẽ be a …xed random variable, and let R and P solve:
Then R increases with …nancial innovation.
Proof. Financial innovation increases the assets span to
Assume that R 0 < R. The …rst equation implies P µ P 0 ; and we infer from the second equation that R
0¸R
; a contradiction. ¥
The proof has a straightforward intuition. Financial innovation and a decrease in the interest rate would both encourage entry. This would in turn create an increase in the interest rate, which leads to a contradiction. The proposition has the important implication that if the participants' average endowment does not vary, existing asset prices necessarily decrease with …nancial innovation. The heterogeneity of individual endowments thus plays a crucial role in determining the impact of …nancial innovation on the price of risky assets. In the next sections, we show this property by considering a multi-factor model of risk exposure.
A Factor Model
The heterogeneity of income risk can be conveniently speci…ed when there exist a …nite number L of risk factors f" 1 ; ::;" L g : The factors correspond for instance to macroeconomic or sectoral shocks that a¤ect the incomes of large groups of workers. We assume that the endowment of each investor h 2 H is a linear combination of the risk factorsẽ We assume that the risk factors and the payo¤s of …nancial assets are jointly normal. Without loss of generality, the factors are chosen to have unit variances and be mutually uncorrelated:" = f" 1 ; ::;" L g s N (0; I) : The measure ¹ on the investor set H induces a measure º on the Euclidean space R L of factor loadings. Since the distribution of the deterministic component of income does not a¤ect equilibrium, we will neglect the di¤erence between these two measures in the rest of this paper. The mean endowment of market participants can thus be writteñ
denotes the average factor loadings of participants. The factors generally do not belong to the span A of risky assets. It is therefore useful to consider their projections or tradable components"
[Cov ("`;ã j )] 2 on the diagonal, and cross elements
'`"`of the factors. Equations (4:1) and (4:2) thus imply that V ar
: Equilibrium relation (3:10) can thus be rewritten
while entry decision (3:8) becomes°2
Rg thus contains the factor loadings of investors who do not trade risky assets. This set is an ellipsoid when the matrix § A has full rank, and a cylinder when § A is singular.
The One Factor Economy
We consider in this section an economy with a unique risk factor". Existing assets span only partially the risk", and the hedging coe¢cient
is a useful measure of market incompleteness. Since the risk factor" has unit variance, the coe¢cient ® is contained between 0 and 1. The distribution of the factor loading ' is speci…ed by a measure ¹ on the real line. It is convenient to consider Assumption 3. The measure ¹ has density f (') with respect to Lebesgue measure, and Supp(f ) = f' 2 R : f (') > 0g is an unbounded interval.
Many of the results presented in this section can be generalized when the measure ¹ display singularities. We …rst analyze the special cases ® = 0 or = 0: When assets have no correlation with the risk factor (® = 0); the participation set is empty under costly entry ( > 0), or indeterminate under free entry ( = 0): In either case, asset prices are uniquely determined: R = R and there is no risk premium. When the hedging coe¢cient is positive (® > 0) and the entry cost is positive and …nite (0 < < 1); we infer from Proposition 1 and Assumption 3 that the set of participants and non-participants both have a positive measure: 0 < ¹(P) < 1:
5
Denote by R(®) the interest rate corresponding to free entry:
It is easy to show that 6 ¹(P)(V ar P ') V ar H ';
in any equilibrium. Finally, we know that that P = ; when the entry cost is in…nite. These results are summarized in Table 1.   5 If everyone participates, ' p = ' and ®°(' h ¡ ') 2 =2¸ R for almost every agent h. This is impossible since the density f is strictly positive on a neighborhood of ':
we infer that ¹(P)V ar P ' R P (' ¡ ') 2 d¹ V ar H ('): 
The participation set P for various levels of the hedging coe¢cient ® and the entry cost
We now further examine the non-degenerate case ® 2 (0; 1] and 2 (0; 1): The average endowment of the participants satis…esẽ
The agents indi¤erent between entry and no-entry satisfy°2
This equation has two solutions ' = ' p § ¤ that lie at the same distance ¤ from ' p . The participation set is therefore P = (¡1;
The indi¤erence condition can be rewritten as°2
By equation (4.4), the equilibrium interest rate satis…es
is the variance of the participants' factor loadings. The de…nition of '
where ¹ ' = R R 'd¹(') is the aggregate risk in the economy. We have thus derived a system of three equations (5:1) ¡ (5:3) in the three unknowns (R; ' p ; ¤). We can …rst show Theorem 6. There exists a unique GEEP equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
This result allows us to perform comparative statics of the GEEP equilibrium. We can thus analyze how …nancial innovation, i.e. an exogenous increase in ®; a¤ects the equilibrium values of the interest rate.
Proposition 3. The riskless rate R is increasing with …nancial innovation.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥ As in models with exogenous participation, the introduction of new assets increases the riskless rate R: Improved risk sharing reduces the precautionary motive, reduces the demand for the riskless asset, and therefore increases the interest rate.
[Add a word of explanation on GEEP economies].
Proposition 4. Financial innovation decreases ' p if and only if
and increases the fraction ¹(P) of market participants if and only if the condition
is satis…ed.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
The measure ¹(P) of market participants increases when the e¤ect of innovation on the riskless rate due to the precautionary motive is not too strong. It is interesting to note that …nancial innovation may imply a decrease in participation.
In a general GEEP model, this can occur because …nancial innovation changes the price of existing assets. Some agents may …nd the new prices su¢ciently unattractive that they prefer to leave the market. In our CARA-normal model, the agents' decision is a¤ected by the riskless rate and by movements in the market portfolio ' p . We now derive su¢cient conditions that guarantee that the function ' p (®) is decreasing in ®: Consider SC1. The density f is decreasing on Supp(f ) = [c; +1)
Under these conditions we know that ®°2¹(P)(V ar P ')=2 °2(V ar H ')=2 < 1 and f (' p + ¤) < f (' p ¡ ¤) in any equilibrium. The function ' p (®) is therefore decreasing in ®: Densities f satisfying (SC1) include the exponential and Â 2 (1) functions on [0; 1):
We can also …nd regions of the (®; ) plane where d' p =d® < 0: Condition (5.5) is satis…ed when ® < ® 1 = 2=(°2V ar P '); i.e. when markets are su¢ciently incomplete. The next question is to control for f (' p + ¤) ¡ f (' p ¡ ¤): Consider SC1a The density f (') is decreasing on a neighborhood of ¹ ':
For any ®¸0; this condition imposes that More generally, condition (SC1a) corresponds to densities skewed to the right. We note that the assumptions of small entry costs and right skewness are very appealing for empirical applications.
To illustrate this e¤ect, consider an asset e a with a positive expected payo¤ E e a: In equilibrium, the asset is worth:
Innovation increases the riskless rate, and therefore tends to reduce the price of a risky asset. This result is well-known in GEI models with exogenous participation, and seems contradictory with the empirical evidence that the price of existing assets tends to increase following the introduction of new assets (). When participation is endogneous, however, we note that the mean factor ' p of market participants can vary with …nancial innovation and can therefore potentially reverse the interest rate e¤ect. More speci…cally, consider an asset e a that is positively correlated with the risk factor": Financial innovation increases the relative price ¼(e a) ¼ 0 = E e a ¡°' p Cov(e a;")
if ' p decreases with innovation. Variations in the mean risk ' p occur when new entrants tend to be less exposed to the factor than the original market participants. This e¤ect is thus closely related to asymmetries in the distribution of risk in the population, as is now shown. In this case, we know the mean ' = exp(³ + ¾ 2 =2) and f reaches a maximum at
Proof. Consider the function
We observe that the function G(') is strictly decreasing and satis…es G(') = 0:
The only e¤ect that innovation has on asset prices is through the interest rate R. ¥ An asymmetric distribution of risk in the economy is therefore required in order to obtain movements in the mean risk factor ' p :
is worth
We assume without loss of generality that ¹ ' > 0: Skewness can manifest in two ways, either there is a majority of agents with a low exposure to the risk factor, and few with a large exposure to it, or the opposite. As can be seen in the appendix (in the formulas used to prove proposition 4), it is for the …rst type that innovation results in a decrease of ' p and therefore an upward pressure on asset prices. We …nd this result encouraging as it appears to be the case that in reality risks are distributed in a asymmetric way with this kind of skewness. 8 Proposition 6. Financial innovation increases the price of the market portfolio if
Proof. We infer from equation 5.6 that
which gives the desired result. [This formula is wrong] ¥
This relation tells us by how much the e¤ect of innovation on participation has to be stronger that the e¤ect on the riskless rate in order for innovation to increase 8 There are few …rms that have a large exposure to risk issuing stock that is bought by a multitude of investors that have a low exposure to risk. asset prices in general. A number of conditions must be satis…ed to observe this e¤ect. We need the e¤ect on the riskless rate to be moderate, this helps in two ways, by making the e¤ect of innovation on ' p stronger, and by moderating the increase of the discounting factor 1=R. Then we need that risk in the economy be distributed with enough skewness to have a large (negative) e¤ect on ' p . As we now show, the conditions for an e¤ect on the risk premium, measured by the ratio of the return for the market portfolio to the return of the risk free rate, are less stringent.
Proposition 7. The risk premium in our economy is larger than in a full participation economy if the condition ' p > ¹ ' is satis…ed for all …nancial structures.
Proof. Let RP and RP 0 respectively denote the risk premium in the restricted and full ( = 0) participation economies. We know that
and therefore RP > RP 0 if and only if
Note that a necessary condition to get this result is that the distribution of risk is skewed with a majority of agents having a low exposure to the risk factor. This result is consistent with that found in the literature of asset pricing with restricted participation 9 , were it is shown that restricted participation biases the risk premium upwards, thus helping to explain the equity premium puzzle.
The Two Factor Economy
We now consider an economy with two risk factors" 1 and" 2 . We assume for simplicity that no asset is jointly correlated to both factors. Equation (4:3) implies that the variance-covariance matrix § A is diagonal:
See Basak and Cuoco (1998), or Vissing-Jorgensen (1998).
where ®`= V ar ¡" À ¢`= 1; 2: Financial innovation is formally described by changes in ®`;`= 1; 2: Higher ®`means better spanning of factor`but unchanged spanning for the remaining factor.
We assume that the measure ¹ has a continuous density f (' 1 ; ' 2 ) with respect to Lebesgue measure. The equilibrium conditions can be rewritten 8 > > < > > :
1) The factor loadings of participants are therefore located outside the ellipse°2 h
which is centered on the participants' average factor loadings ' p : The price of an existing assetã correlated with factor k is given by
We can analyze in the (' 1 ; ' 2 ) space how participation is a¤ected by …nancial innovation. A higher interest rate widens the ellipse vertical and horizontal axes whereas higher factor one spanning (higher ® 1 ) translates into a reduced length of the ellipse horizontal axis.
The following proposition focus on the e¤ect of …nancial innovation when f is symmetric.
Proposition 8. Let f be symmetric around its mean ¹ '. Then ' p = ¹ ' for any …nancial structure, and R is increasing with …nancial innovation.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥ Figure 6 .1 illustrate Proposition 2 in the case of increasing spanning of risk factor one. Before …nancial innovation only the agents outside the wider ellipse trade in risky assets. After …nancial innovation, all agents with factor loadings in the light grey area enter risky asset markets whereas the agents in the dark area exit. The participants average factor loadings remain equal to the means of distribution f and, as a direct consequence of Proposition 1, the interest rate increases widening the ellipse vertical axis. In general …nancial innovation (higher ® 1 ) changes the set of participants' factor loadings symmetrically around the ellipse center. When f is symmetric, the same measure of agents with opposite risk exposure enter and exit the economy so that the participants' average factor loadings do not change.
We now consider the case in which f is skewed towards the origin. In Figures  (6. 2)¡(6.4); a representative simulation results are reported. Financial innovation relative to risk factor one increases participation and the interest rate. The price of existing assets will be a¤ected di¤erently depending on their correlation with factor one. The increase in R will tend to reduce prices of all existing asset whereas the decline of both ' p 1 and ' p 2 will work in the opposite direction for assets positively correlated with risk factors. As …gure 6.3 shows, this e¤ect is higher for the assets in the direction of innovation.
In …gure 6.5 we represent the simulation results in the space of factor loadings. With f skewed towards the origin, more agents with low risk exposure enter …nancial markets thereby reducing participants' average loading to both factor one and two (the ellipse center moves to O 0 ). Despite the fact that …nancial innovation pertains only factor one and that risk factors are uncorrelated, ' p 2 declines as well. This is possible since a positive measure of agents exposed to risk factor two …nd convenient to participate to risky asset markets. Yet, entry will occur mainly in the direction of innovation making the e¤ect on ' The e¤ect on the interest rate is positive in the simulation outlined in …gure 6.2-6.4. Both the displacement and the precautionary savings e¤ects happen to be positive. Yet we have obtained simulations in which the number of participants decrease creating a downward pressure in the interest rate via the displacement a¤ect. We also conjecture that the precautionary saving e¤ect could be negative as well. The intuition being that, within the class of participating agents, those with average exposure to risk factor one and with little exposure to risk factor two have higher precautionary motive after …nancial innovation.
Appendix

Proof of Theorem 2
We base our argument on the existence proof provided by Hens (1991) for the standard GEI case.
Individual Excess Demand
Given p 0 > 0 and a vector (¼ 0 ; ¼) of asset prices, it is convenient to de…ne q = (p 0 ; ¼ 0 ; ¼) and the budget set
The no-arbitrage set
is an open convex cone of R J +2 ; and it is useful to consider its closure ] of a participating and non-participating agent of type h. Given a participation decision d 2 fi; ng, the excess demand function Z hd (q) is continuous, homogeneous of degree 0, and satis…es Walras' law. We can then de…ne the excess demand correspondence
where V h (z) denotes the utility U h (c 0 ; e e h +µ 0 +e a:µ) associated to an excess demand strategy z = [c 0 + 1 fµ6 =0g ¡ e h 0 ; µ 0 ; µ]. We observe that Z h (q) is homogeneous of degree 0, upper hemi-continuous and satis…es Walras' law.
Consider a vector q 2 QnQ; q 6 = 0; and a sequence fq n g 1 n=1 of elements of Q converging to q: We want to show that inffkzk ; z 2 Z h (q n )g ! 1: Proceed by contradiction and assume that there exists a bounded sequence fz
has then a cluster point z: Without loss of generality, it is convenient to henceforth neglect subsequence notation and directly assume that z n ! z. Given x 2 b B h (q); we know that x is the limit of a sequence fx n g;
Letting n go to in…nity, we infer that
; which is absurd. This establishes that inffkzk ; z 2 Z h (q n )g ! 1 as n ! 1: We can also consider the matrices M = [a 0 ; ::; a J ] and N = 1 M¸; and show by a similar argument that inffkzk ; z 2 N Z h (q n )g ! 1 as n ! 1: Moreover since consumption is non-negative, the set N Z h (q n )¸¡e h is bounded below.
Market Excess Demand
We now de…ne the market excess demand
The correspondence Z(q) is upper hemi-continuous, convex and compact-valued, homogeneous of degree 0 and satis…es Walras' law: q:Z(q)´0: Moreover consider an arbitrary vector b q 2 Q and a sequence fq n g 1 n=1 of elements of Q converging to a vector q 2 QnQ; q 6 = 0: Since each N Z h (q n ) is bounded below, we infer that N Z(q n ) is bounded below and inffkzk ; z 2 N Z(q n )g ! 1. The absence of arbitrage implies that
for n large enough. We then conclude by standard arguments (Debreu, 1956; Grandmont, 1977; Hens, 1991) that there exists an equilibrium price.
Proof of Theorem 3
Let u(c) = ¡ exp(¡°c)=°: The decision problem consists of maximizing
¤ with respect to the unconstrained variables c 0 and µ: Sincec is normally distributed, we infer that
The objective function can thus be rewritten 
and second period consumption satis…es e c hA = e e hA + e a:µ h = e m A : Second, we solve for optimal initial consumption c 0 by maximizing
We infer from the …rst order condition that
; which implies (3.4). We then deduce µ h 0 from the budget constraint. Since u = ¡u 0 =°; the optimal utility level satis…es
and thus
Proof of Theorem 5
By (3:3) and (3:6) ; the mean demand R H µ h 0 d¹(h) for the riskless asset is
In equilibrium, the interest rate therefore satis…es°¡
which is equivalent to (3.10).
Proof of Theorem 6
For any (' p ; ¤) 2 R £ [0; +1); consider the function
For every ¤¸0; the function G ¤ (' p )´G(' p ; ¤) is continuous and strictly decreasing. It also satis…es G ¤ (' p ) ! +1 as ' p ! ¡1; and G ¤ (' p ) ! ¡1 as ' p ! +1: Therefore the equation G(' p ; ¤) = 0 has a unique solution, which we denote ' p (¤): By the Implicit Function Theorem, the function
We observe that @G=@' p = ¡¤r ¡ ¹(P) < 0, @G=@¤ = ¡¤¢; and therefore
The sign of d' p =d¤ thus depends on the value of the density f at the endpoints ' p ¡¤ and ' p +¤: Since¯d' p =d¤¯ ¤r=[¤r+¹(P)] < 1; the functions ' p (¤)¡¤ and ' p (¤) + ¤ are respectively decreasing and increasing in ¤: We also note that the monotonicity of these functions is strict.
We now consider the correspondence
and the functions H 0 (¤) = ¹[P(¤)] and H 1 (¤) = ¹[P(¤)](V ar P(¤) '). We want to show that the functions H 0 and H 1 are decreasing in ¤: First observe that the monotonicities of ' p (¤) ¡ ¤ and ' p (¤) + ¤ implies that
is strictly decreasing in ¤: It also straightforward that
and therefore
Similarly, the function
The functions H 0 and H 1 are thus decreasing in ¤:
In equilibrium, R and ¤ are determined by the system
In the (¤; R) plane, these relations de…ne two curves (C 1 ) and (C 2 ). We can write R = C 1 (¤) and R = C 2 (¤): We note that C 1 is decreasing, C 2 is increasing, C 1 (0) > R 0 > C 2 (0); and C 2 (+1) = +1: Therefore there exists a unique equilibrium. Moreover, we observe that an exogenous increase in ® pushes up both curves, leading to an increase in the interest rate R: The variation in ¤ depends on the relative slopes of H 0 and H 1 ; and is examined in greater detail in the proof Proposition 3. Similarly, an exogenous increase in the entry cost pushes up (C 1 ) and pushes down (C 2 ); leading to an increase in ¤: The variation of R seems ambiguous and is examined in greater detail in the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3
We know that the equilibrium vector (R; ¤) solves the system ½ R ¡ ®°¤ 2 =2 = 0 ln R ¡ ln R 0 ¡ °H 0 (¤) ¡ ®°2H 1 (¤)=2 = 0:
where P = (¡1; ' We now use Cramer's rule to …nd the e¤ect of …nancial innovation on the equilibrium interest rate
and the width parameter ¤ :
¡( =®) £ 1 ¡ ®°2¹(P)(V ar P ')=2 ¤ = det J:
We infer that d' This implies that the mass of participants decreases with the transaction cost : Finally, d' p =d® has the sign of f (' p + ¤) ¡ f (' p ¡ ¤):
Proof of Proposition 4
By de…nition of ¹(P); the e¤ect of …nancial innovation on participation is given by d¹(P) d®
Plug in the derivatives d' p =d® and d' p =d¤ calculated in the proof of Proposition 3:
We thus infer that d¹(P)=d® has the same sign as 1 ¡ (®°2=2)¹(P)(V ar P ').
Proof of Proposition 8
The equilibrium conditions (??) can be rewritten in polar coordinates (see the appendix for the derivation):
ln R = ln R 0 +° R +1
Polar coordinates
De…ne:
x`= '`¡ ' p ¢`;`= 1; 2: 
2 ) dx 1 dx 2 ;`= 1; 2 (7.4)
we can rewrite (7:4) as: Z Consider now the following transformation of variables to a polar coordinates system:
The integral in ( and @H i @¤ j and therefore
We infer that the value function V is increasing in its arguments. We note that when ¤ ! @R 
for all i 6 = j:
Lemma. The value function V (¤) is strictly concave, and
: for all i = 1; 2:
Proof. 
